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Abstract 
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‘FDI option’ as a put option, thereby also enriching the theory of real options. 
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1 Introduction
More than two-thirds of world trade today is determined by activities
of multinational enterprises, a phenomenon not well explained by the tradi-
tional trade theory. For many years the economics of relationship between
trade and investment were studied as complements or substitutes (Mundell,
1957; Lipsey and Weiss, 1981; Blomstrom et al, 1988). More recent stud-
ies indicate such a generalization is not possible, and that both trade and
investment ows are determined simultaneously by the location decisions of
multinational rms (Markusen, 2002).
New trade theoryhas developed general equilibrium models for multi-
national rms in the presence of imperfect competition (Markusen and Ven-
ables, 1998; Markusen, 2002; Helpman, 1984). While the vertical multina-
tionals are explained by factor proportion analysis, horizontal multinational
activity is explained by the proximity-concentration trade-o¤(Brainard, 1993;
Brainard, 1997). More recently, Export vs FDI cut o¤ has been derived in
the presence of rm heterogeneity (Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004).
Real life behaviour is somewhat more complex than what can be explained
by a conventional cost-benet analysis. While most of the work above is
based on a standard Marshallian kind of economic analysis, evidence indi-
cates that rms investment decisions, and even more so, foreign investment
decisions are undertaken in the face of uncertainty. Studies indicate that if
we fail to take this into account, then, even for reasonable parameter values,
we may be up to two times o¤ the mark as compared to a routine cost-benet
analysis (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
Even when comparative advantage indicates foreign investment should
ow in or when economic liberalization removes barriers to such investments,
they do not automatically ow in. There is a considerable wait-and-watch,
a kind of time lag or inertia followed by herd behaviour when foreign invest-
ments actually start owing in. This implies existence of a value-for-waiting
or in other words, some opportunity cost beyond what is accounted for in a
pure comparative advantage-trade cost framework.
Almost simultaneously as the new trade theory was taking shape, a strand
of literature was growing out of the core nance theory to model investment
decisions of individual rms under uncertainty. Starting with the work of
McDonald and Siegel (1986) on the value of waiting to invest and Dixits
(1989) work on rms investment decisions under uncertainty, a rich litera-
ture has developed on investment under uncertainty a la Dixit and Pindyck
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(1994). Baldwin and Krugman (1989) modelled hysteresis in trade under as-
sumptions of large exchange rate shocks. Dixit (1989) applied it to exchange
rate pass-through under perfect competition. Rafael and Vettas (2003) mod-
elled Export and FDI for a single seller in the presence of growing demand.
Their model showed that FDI is the preferred mode of production for proven
demand, while exports is the preferred mode of production for uncertain
demand.
I take a step forward from the existing literature and develop a model
of many sellers (multinational rms) operating under foreign investment un-
certainty within the framework of a Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic compe-
tition. I use option theory to derive an optimal foreign investment rule and
model policy driven FDI liberalization as a mixed Poisson jump-Brownian
motion stochastic process. Another useful feature of this model is that while
investment under uncertainty literature is based on the theory of call options,
I solve FDI optionas a put option, thereby also enriching the theory of real
options.
Section 2 presents the underlying static model. Section 3 introduces
foreign investment uncertainty and develops its inter-temporal counterpart.
Section 4 elaborates some comparative experiments. Section 5 extends the
model by introducing a mixed Poisson jump-Brownian motion stochastic
process. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Static Model
There are two countries: i and j. There are two goods: Y, a homogeneous
good, and X, a di¤erentiated good with imperfectly substitutable varieties in
the Dixit-Stiglitz fashion. Skilled labour (S) is the only factor of production
and all costs are expressed in units of this factor.
Good Y (the homogeneous good) is produced by a perfectly competitive
industry using a constant returns to scale technology:
Yi =
1
ay
Siy (1)
where ay is the unit labour requirement and Siy is the amount of skilled
labour used in production of good Y. Its transport is costless and it is treated
as numeraire (price normalized to one).
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Good X, the di¤erentiated good, is produced by a monopolistically com-
petitive industry. Varieties of this good can be produced by national (indexed
by n) or multi-national (indexed by m) rms. Let Nni , N
m
i ,N
n
j ,N
m
j stand
for the number of rms of each type operating in equilibrium, headquartered
respectively in country i and j.
Sector X has a linear cost function with both xed and variable costs.3
Total production costs for a national rm in country j are given by:
Snjx = H
n +Gn + cXnjj + cX
n
ji (2)
where c are the constant marginal costs, Xnjj and X
n
ji are respectively the
outputs for domestic and foreign markets. Further, Hn are the headquarter
level xed costs and Gn are the plant level xed costs, both of which are at
least partly irreversible or sunk.
Similarly, total production costs for a multinational rm located in coun-
try j are given by:
Smjx + S
m
ix = H
m +Gn + cXmjj +G
m
i + cX
m
ji (3)
where rst part on the right hand side are the costs of operation within
the home country and the second part on right hand side are the costs of
operating in the foreign country.
Headquarter costs of multi-national operation, Hm, are typically di¤erent
from headquarter costs of national operation, Hn, because of the need for
greater headquarter services and additional costs of creating trans-national
networks. Similarly, costs of foreign investment, Gmi or j, are di¤erent from a
similar initiative by domestic rms, Gn, as almost all countries have specic
FDI regimes, meaning thereby that routes and mechanisms prescribed for for-
eign investment are di¤erent from those prescribed for domestic rms. Costs
of foreign investment are also di¤erent between the two countries (Gmi 6= Gmj )
and depend on their local foreign investment environments.
Assuming diversied production,4 wage (w) is pinned down by the nu-
meraire sector in both the countries:
w =
1
ay
(4)
3Presence of xed costs in the cost function implies economies of scale.
4I assume labour endowment and value of demand parameters is such that both coun-
tries produce both the goods. Symmetric countries always have diversied production.
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Total incomes in both the countries depend on their respective factor
endowments:
Mi = wSi (5)
Mj = wSj (6)
On the demand side, there is a representative consumer in each country
with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, which for countries i and j are:
Ui = X

icY
1 
ic (7)
Uj = X

jcY
1 
jc (8)
Here, Xic is the CES aggregate of x-varieties in the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz
fashion given by:
Xic = [N
n
i (X
n
ii)
 +Nnj (X
n
ji)
 +Nmi (X
m
ii )
 +Nmj
 
Xmji

]
1
 ; (9)
such that f0 <  < 1g :
Dene  = 1
1  as the elasticity of substitution between any two x-varieties.
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N; as before, is the number of rms of each type operating in equilibrium.
This utility function permits two stage budgeting:
In the rst stage budgeting, the consumer allocates his total income to
goods X and Y through the following demand functions:
Yic = (1  )Mi (10)
Xic = 
Mi
ei
=
Mix
ei
(11)
Here, Mix is the amount of country is national income spent on good X,
ei is the unit expenditure function for Xic (also called the price index) and
as already mentioned, good Y is used as numeraire (i.e. its price is equal to
one).
In the second stage budgeting, the consumer solves the sub-utility maxi-
mization problem for individual varieties. Demand for an individual variety
is then a solution to the sub-utility maximization problem given by:
xk = p
 
k e
 1
i Mix (12)
5I assume symmetry within each category of x-varieties in the CES function above.
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where subscript k stands for an individual variety and the remaining variables
are as dened above.
In large group monopolistic competition each individual rm takes the
price index ei and country income Mi as given. The proportional mark-up
of price over variable costs is given by:
p = (

  1)
c
ay
(13)
where c is the units of labour used in producing one unit of the good (x-
variety) and 1=ay is the wage rate. This pricing equation comes from the
rst order condition, called the marginal revenue equals marginal cost con-
dition. The proportional markup of price over marginal costs is constant
and independent of market shares. For constant marginal costs and equal
wages, this implies each x-variety is produced for the same price px = p in
equilibrium. However, x-varieties produced by national rms are sold abroad
for a higher price p ; where  are the iceberg trade costs.
As in the trade cost literature,  are the inclusive trade costs. They
include not only transport costs but all intermediate costs like tari¤ barri-
ers, non-tari¤ barriers, border costs, information costs, time costs, currency
costs etc. According to the literature, trade costs are fairly large, an average
estimate being 170% of the value of the output (Anderson and Wincoop,
2004). Currency costs are only a small proportion of it about 8-14% out of
a total 170%, and this includes both transaction and hedging costs. Trading
horizon is typically short-term (few days to few weeks) and currency risks
over short periods are easily hedged in nancial markets today, say through
the spot rate or a short-term forward, which is either costless or has costs
which are small. I do not assume large exchange rate shocks as in Baldwin
and Krugman (1989), but medium to long term exchange rate risk, which is
not easy to hedge against in the forward foreign exchange market, matters
for foreign direct investment among other sources of aggregate uncertainty
mentioned in section 3 below. This is because the ability to limit risks posed
by long term exchange rate shifts is either unavailable or is very expensive
(Guay and Kothari, 2003). Further, the foreign exchange futures market is
also illiquid beyond the short-term (Layard et al, 2002). As compared to a
more straightforward trading decision, FDI typically takes place in the face
of foreign investment uncertainty. This will be explicitly modelled later.
Production regime for the X-sector is determined by a set of conditions
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called the zero-prot conditions given below:
pXnii + pX
n
ij  wcXnii + wcXnij + w(Hn +Gn) (Nni ) (14)
pXmii + pX
m
ij  wcXmii + wcXmij + w(Hm +Gn) + wGmj (Nmi )
pXnjj + pX
n
ji  wcXnjj + wcXnji + w(Hn +Gn) (Nnj )
pXmjj + pX
m
ji  wcXmjj + wcXmji + w(Hm +Gn) + wGmi (Nmj )
These are written as inequalities in the complementary slackness form,
meaning thereby that an equation will hold with equality if the output of
the corresponding rm is positive, otherwise the output of the corresponding
rm is zero. These conditions relate markup revenues to investment costs and
number of rms is the endogenous variable. Depending on whether markup
revenues cover investment costs or not, rms decide whether to operate as a
national rm exporting to the foreign market or undertake a foreign direct
investment abroad i.e. become multinational.
Let us assume for a moment that each type of rm is active in equilibrium.
Demand functions for varieties produced by each of these rms, as derived
from the respective sub-utility maximization problems are given below:
Xnii = X
m
ii = X
m
ji = p
 e 1i Mix = p
 e 1i Mi = p
 e 1i wSi (15)
Xnjj = X
m
jj = X
m
ij = p
 e 1j Mjx = p
 e 1j Mj = p
 e 1j wSj
Xnji = p
  1 e 1i Mix = p
  1 e 1i Mi = p
  1 e 1i wSi
Xnij = p
  1 e 1j Mjx = p
  1 e 1j Mj = p
  1 e 1j wSj
Iceberg trade costs imply, if a quantity Xnji is shipped by a national (ex-
porting) rm, only
Xnji

arrives in the foreign country and is sold for a price
p . Mix or Mjx is respectively the amount of national income spent on good
X, which is further substituted out in terms of the demand parameters, the
wage incomes and factor endowments.
It is possible to further simplify the zero-prot conditions above by using
the pricing equation and Marshallian demand functions for individual x-
varieties. Some algebra (see appendix A) yields a simplied set of conditions,
which determine the production regime for the X-sector, and these equations
written compactly for country j rms are:
p1  1 e 1i Si + p
1 e 1j Sj  (Hn +Gn) (Nnj ) (16)
p1 e 1i Si + p
1 e 1j Sj  (Hm +Gn) + Gmi (Nmj )
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and similarly, for country i rms are:
p1 e 1i Si + p
1  1 e 1j Sj  (Hn +Gn) (Nni ) (17)
p1 e 1i Si + p
1 e 1j Sj  (Hm +Gn) + Gmj (Nmi )
As before, all equations will not hold with equality at one time. If one
of them holds with equality, the corresponding number of rms is positive,
otherwise the corresponding number of rms is zero.
3 The Inter-temporal Model
For inter-temporal analysis it is necessary to specify the starting and the
end points. Let us start at time t = 0 with a national production regime,
where only exporting rms are operating in both the countries and there is
diversied production. This implies existence of a pure trading equilibrium
(no FDI) with both intra-industry and inter-industry trade. Let us assume
the representative consumer lives, and that rms potentially operate, forever.
National rms in the pure trading equilibrium have an option to undertake
foreign direct investment and start multinational production abroad. At
some time t between t = 0 and t = 1 this option could be exercised and
the production regime would switch from national to multinational, provided
it is optimal to do so. I will explicitly solve for this optimal foreign investment
rule.
As compared to a more straight-forward trading (export) decision, FDI is
typically undertaken in the face of foreign investment uncertainty. This is an
aggregate uncertainty arising from the foreign environment and could be be-
cause of statutory FDI policies, corporate governance/tax regimes, medium-
to-long-term exchange rate risks, policy shifts like economic liberalization,
incentive competition,6 industry or economy-wide macro shocks, political in-
stability etc. This uncertainty cannot be easily hedged and exists even when
a multinational rm undertakes a foreign direct investment into a seemingly
similar economy. It is this uncertainty which is of interest here and is rep-
resented by a stochastic shift variable Ri; multiplicative with the costs of
6Incentive competition refers to national governments competing with each other to
o¤er investment incentives to multinational rms so as to attract FDI into their respective
countries.
8
foreign investment, say for country i:
Gmi = GRi (18)
Notice the two components of foreign investment  a certain part (G)
and an uncertain part (Ri). This being a real model (there is no money
here), costs of uncertainty associated with trade-in-invisibles, which are an
integral part of any foreign direct investment, are included in the process Ri.
Such trade-in-invisibles includes head-quarter services, royalty payments,
repatriation of prots and cross-border investment ows, which are subject
not only to the regulatory/capital controls, but also to medium to long term
exchange rate risks.
In the rst instance, I assume this stochastic shift variable follows a geo-
metric Brownian motion, whereby the stochastic process underlying foreign
investment uncertainty is given by:7
dRi = iRidt+ iRidWt (19)
Here, i is the drift, i is the volatility and dWt is a Gauss-Wiener process
representing Brownian motion and at any instant satisfying E(dW ) = 0 and
E(dW 2) = dt.
An uncertainty which is equally faced by both national and multinational
rms does not generate an option value between trading and FDI, but foreign
investment uncertainty which is faced only by multi-national rms, implies
existence of a real option, say for country js exporting rms to either under-
take a foreign direct investment in country i or to keep exporting as national
rms as they were doing at time t = 0. I will henceforth call this the FDI
option.
To simplify exposition of this model, I will focus on country i and assume
that country j follows a restrictive FDI regime and does not permit any
foreign direct investment within its borders. Relaxing this assumption is
trivial and the same formulation would apply to the other country.
For an individual rm in country j, production decision at any time t
7This is an important theoretical benchmark. I will later extend the model by intro-
ducing Poisson jumps and formulating a mixed Brownian motion-Poisson jump process,
which provides a better way of modelling uncertainty related to FDI policy.
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between t = 0 and t =1 is given by the present value formulation:
1Z
t
e t(p1  1 e 1i0 Si + p
1 e 1j Sj)dt (20)
=
1Z
t
e t[(Hn +Gn)]dt (with no FDI)
OR
E
1Z
t
e t(p1 e 1i1 Si + p
1 e 1j Sj)dt (with FDI)
= E [
1Z
t
e t[(Hm +Gn)]dt+ GR0 +
1Z
t
e t(GRie(i 
1
2
2i )teWt)dt]
where  is the (riskless) discount rate,  is the demand parameter,  are
the trade costs, ei orj is the aggregate price index, ei0 to ei1is the expected
change in price index when FDI is undertaken in country i, Si orj are the
factor endowments,  is the elasticity of substitution between any two x-
varieties and Hn or m are the headquarter xed costs. In writing the present
value formulation, I use the stochastic di¤erential equation 19 from above.
Foreign investment costs are split into two parts - GR0; the setup costs which
are revealed at time t (hence E[GRt ] = GR0, no discounting needed) and
GRi; the subsequent costs over which expectations are formed and need to
be explicitly solved for.
An individual rm takes prices and incomes as given. It is already op-
erating as a national rm in country j (the rst equality above), but forms
expectations over what would happen if it decided to switch from national
to a multinational mode of production (the second equality above). OR
between the two equalities indicates existence of a real optionbetween the
two choices.
The rms know their operating characteristics and market structure well.
Demand parameters and total factor endowments are given and assumed not
to change with time. All rms are identical (i.e. homogeneous) and rational.
Thus, when it becomes optimal for one rm in country j to switch from a
national to multinational mode of production, it also becomes optimal for
other national rms in country j to do so. Under assumption of rational
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expectations, this forward looking behaviour implies an individual rm can
fully anticipate the change in aggregate price index that would be caused
by this switch in production regime from national to multinational, as the
producer price of an individual x-variety, p; and the trade costs,  , remain
unchanged. This implies
Efei1g = ei1 =

Nni p
1  +Nmj p
1 " 11  (21)
Thus, expectation on left hand side of the second equation is easily taken
care of, as rational expectation implies expected present discounted value of
mark-up revenues is same as its present discounted value:
E
1Z
t
e t(p1 e 1i1 Si + p
1 e 1j Sj):dt
=
1Z
t
e t(p1 e 1i1 Si + p
1 e 1j Sj):dt
=


p1 e 1i1 Si +


p1 e 1j Sj (22)
The expectation on right hand side of the second equation is more tricky
as it involves solving the stochastic integral:
E
1Z
t
e tfGRi:e(i  122i )tgfeWtg:dt (23)
Using stochastic calculus (for details see Appendix B), this expectation
can be simplied because:
EfGRi:e(i  122i )tgfeWtg = GRi:et (24)
The expected present discounted value of xed costs for a multinational
rm potentially operating in country j can therefore be simplied to:
E
1Z
t
e t[(Hm +Gn)]:dt+ GR0 + E
1Z
t
e t(GRi:e(i 
1
2
2i )t:eWt):dt
11
=


(Hm +Gn) + GR0 +
GRi
   (25)
Present value of markup revenues and xed costs for a national rm
operating in country j (rst part of equation 20 above) can be written as:
1Z
t
e t(p1  1 e 1i0 Si + p
1 e 1j Sj)dt =


p1  1 e 1i0 Si +


p1 e 1j Sj
(26)
and
1Z
t
e t[(Hn +Gn)]dt =


(Hn +Gn) (27)
respectively.
Having simplied the integrals, we still need to take into account the
opportunity cost of real option between exporting and FDI, as indicated by
the term ORin the decision making problem of an individual rm above.
While an operating national rm knows the trade costs it saves fairly well
(from its account books), the potential foreign investment costs are at best
only an estimate.
Let us call the rst state V(ex) and the second state V(fdi). By moving
from state V(ex) to V(fdi) the rm not only gains mark-up revenues due to
the trade costs saved, but also expects to lose the present value of foreign
investment costs that potentially need to be incurred. The exercise of this
option can be interpreted as a trade-o¤ between the expected gain and loss
in the value of the rm in moving from one state (exporting as a national
rm) to the other (undertaking foreign investment as a multinational rm).
To simplify notation, let T be the present value of gain in mark-up rev-
enues due to the saving of trade costs when a country js exporting rm
undertakes foreign direct investment into country i and let bR be the present
value of foreign investment costs that will need to be incurred when this
happens. Formally:
T =


p1 ( 1 e 1i0   e 1i1 )Si (28)
bR = GR0 + GRi
   (29)
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Let F
 bR; t;T be the value of this option to switch production regime
from exporting to FDI. Payo¤ from exercising this option at any time t is
given by the function:
g
 bR; t;T = max[T   bR; 0] (30)
Taking an analogy from the nance theory, this is like an American Put
Option, a class of options that are typically harder to solve and do not have
closed form solutions. Such option functions are called free boundary prob-
lems and they are essentially variational problems in stochastic mathematics.
Fortunately, this real option is not exactly like its nancial counterparts. I
will use an original idea from Merton (1973), which states that if time to ma-
turity is innite, the option pricing function becomes time independent and
a closed form solution exists. Such options are called perpetual putsand its
option pricing function is written as F
 bR; t =1 ;T or simply, F  bR ;T.
There are two equivalent ways of solving this problem - either through
contingent claim analysis using the arbitrage theory or through stochastic
dynamic programming. Because of its expositional neatness I will hereby use
the arbitrage theory.
Using the second order Taylor series and Itos lemma gives us the following
partial di¤erential equation for the option pricing function:
(  )RF 0(R)dt+ 1
2
2R2F "(R)dt = Rdt (31)
where  =    (a la Dixit, Pindyck,1994). , which is sometimes called
the convenience yield, is the di¤erence between the drift term and the riskless
rate of return.
To solve for the option value, the partial di¤erential equation is combined
with the following boundary conditions:
1. F (1;T ) = 0, a terminalcondition, which means this option is of no
value, if the foreign investment costs tend to innity.
2. F (R;T ) = T  R, a value matchingcondition, which describes the
payo¤s when it becomes optimal to undertake FDI abroad.
3. @F (R
;T )
@R
=  1, a smooth-pastingor high contactboundary condi-
tion, which implies that slope of payo¤ and option pricing function match at
the exercise boundary and if not, it would not be optimal to exercise. There
is thus a continuity or smooth pasting at the optimal exercise boundary.
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The general solution to this di¤erential equation is :
F (R;1;T ) = a1R + a2R  (32)
where
 =
1
2
2   (  ) +
q 
(  )  1
2
2
2
+ 22
2
(33)
is the positive root of the fundamental quadratic equation:
Q =
1
2
2 () (   1) + (  ) ()   = 0 (34)
The rst boundary condition implies a1 = 0:
The second or value matching condition implies a2 = (T  R)R
Now, from the smooth pasting condition, general solution evaluated at
the optimal value, R is :
@F (R;1;T )
@R
=  a2R   1 =  1 (35)
Substituting for a2 :
  (T  R)RR   1 =  1 (36)
This can be simplied to:
T =
1 + 

bR (37)
This gives us the optimal foreign investment rule, which is a determin-
istic, time-independent solution. As described earlier, T is the present value
of gain in mark-up revenues (due to saving of the trade costs ) and R is the
present value of foreign investment costs that would need to be incurred at
the optimal exercise boundary for this FDI option.
Intuitively, this rule says, uncertainty combined with irreversibility drives
a wedge between the present value of gain in mark-up revenues due to the
trade costs saved and a critical value of the foreign investment costs that need
14
to be incurred. The size of this wedge is equal to 1+

. The wedge implies
hysteresis, because by lowering the critical value of foreign investment costs
it makes exercise of the FDI option less likely.
If volatility   ! 0 (which implies no uncertainty), the positive root
  ! 1 and the optimal scale-up factor 1+

 ! 1, implying there is no
hysteresis. If on the other hand volatility   ! 1 , the positive root
  ! 0 and the optimal scale-up factor 1+

 ! 1, implying the FDI
option would not be exercised, no matter how small the foreign investment
costs are or how big the gains from cutting trade costs are.
Thus, parameterized in time, the total e¤ect of foreign investment uncer-
tainty is determined through its e¤ect on present discounted values of trade
costs saved, the foreign investment costs incurred and through the opportu-
nity cost of real option between exporting and FDI. Perpetual Putmakes
our life simple, because we can solve for the equilibrium recursively at any
point in time and the optimal foreign investment rule remains unchanged (a
closed from solution exists).
Equilibrium conditions for country j rms can now be written in the
complementary slackness form as follows:


p1  1 e 1i0 Si +


p1 e 1j Sj 


(Hn +Gn) (Nnj )


p1 e 1i1 Si +


p1 e 1j Sj 


(Hm +Gn) + (
1 + 

)[GR0 +
GRi
   ] (N
m
j )
(38)
Aggregate price index, which is endogenous, may be further substituted
out using the expressions below:
ei0 = [N
n
i p
1  +Nnj (p)
1 ]
1
1 
ei1 = [N
n
i p
1  +Nmj p
1 ]
1
1 
ej = [N
n
i (p)
1  +Nnj p
1 ]
1
1  (39)
We can see that while foreign investment uncertainty is driven by an ex-
ogenous stochastic shift variable, the real option between exporting and FDI
is an indicator function, meaning thereby that optimal foreign investment
rule is deterministic, and so are the other endogenous variables, which af-
ter substituting out the price index, essentially mean the number of rms of
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each type operating in equilibrium. This denes the equilibrium production
regime. If there was no uncertainty, there would be no option value, and
hence, no scale-up over foreign investment costs, and we would be back to a
standard Marshallian kind of revenue-cost analysis.
It is also pertinent to mention that, what is modelled here is only the
option decision relating to switching of production regime from trading to
FDI, after having started at time t = 0 with exporting (national) rms in
both the countries. This has been called the FDI option. It ceases to have
an option value after it is exercised. The reverse is usually not a symmetric
phenomenon, but rather a pure exit decision for which a separate option
problem needs to be formulated. Such exit options have been adequately
modelled in the literature (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
To summarize, we start at time t = 0 with a pure trading equilibrium
and diversied production. Let us say that foreign investment environment
in country i is not conducive to start with and trading (exporting) rms from
country j, which are identical and rational, optimally decide to continue as
national rms. These rms wait and watch, thereby retaining an option to
undertake FDI abroad, which is valued in terms of its opportunity cost. Say
later, because of some FDI reforms, foreign investment environment in coun-
try i becomes favourable and at some point in time, in accordance with the
foreign investment rule, it becomes optimal for country js exporting rms to
exercise this option. Being identical and rational, they all rush to undertake
FDI in country i. There will be both partial and general equilibrium e¤ects.
While partial equilibrium e¤ects are reected in the costs and savings for
individual rms, general equilibrium e¤ects are reected in the changes in
the aggregate price index and the type of rms operating in equilibrium.
The producer price of an individual x-variety remains unchanged, as also the
equilibrium wage, which is pinned down by the numeraire sector. The factor
market undergoes a simultaneous adjustment as part of the skilled labour
in country j freed up by its national rms starting multinational production
abroad is used up in headquarter services, while the remaining shifts to the
numeraire good sector Y whose production expands. Exactly the opposite
happens in country i, where multinational production by country j rms at-
tracts additional skilled labour to the X sector and the numeraire good sector
contracts. I maintain the assumption that labour endowment and value of
demand parameters is such that production remains diversied.
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4 Comparative Experiments
We have seen above that foreign investment uncertainty drives a wedge be-
tween the trade costs saved and the foreign investment costs incurred, thereby
delaying FDI into country i, beyond what is predicted by riskless cost-benet
analysis. This is hysteresis.
I will now conduct some thought experiments to answer the questions of
"when"- that is to analyze the e¤ect of uncertainty on timing of foreign in-
vestment given comparative advantage and trade costs; and of "where", that
is, in the presence of foreign investment uncertainty, where would it be opti-
mal to undertake FDI amongst alternative locations, given some comparative
advantage and trade costs?
E¤ect of Volatility : Let us say the foreign investment environment in
country i is more risky as compared to the foreign investment environment
in country j, that is i > j:
Volatility a¤ects the optimal decision rule through scale-up factor
1 + 

: (40)
By totally di¤erentiating the fundamental quadratic with respect to volatil-
ity parameter  holding drift constant (a mean preserving spread):
@Q
@
@
@
+
@Q
@
= 0 (41)
Now, Q(1) =  ; i.e. fundamental quadratic valued at  = 1 is negative.
This implies the positive root  is greater than one.
Further, Q(0) =  , i.e. fundamental quadratic valued at  = 0 is
negative.
This helps us plot the fundamental quadratic, which is itself is a function
of .
For  = 0:2;  = 0:05 and  = 0:03 this plot is as follows:
17
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
gamma
f(gamma)
Figure 1: Graph for the fundamental quadratic equation (the stochastic
process is geometric Brownian motion with drift).
The partial derivative @Q
@
= () (   1) is positive, given that  is a
positive parameter and ; the positive root of the fundamental quadratic,
is greater than 1. The partial derivative @Q
@
> 0 (is also positive) as the
fundamental quadratic is increasing at its positive root (see graph above).
Thus, for the total di¤erentiation equality to hold, @
@
< 0, that is, the partial
derivative of gamma with respect to the volatility parameter is negative.
Therefore, if  increases,  decreases and the optimal scale-up factor 1+

increases.
In other words, comparing two countries i and j, if i > j; the cost of
FDI option is higher in country i and we need either a higher saving of trade
costs from country j to i, or in the presence of falling foreign investment costs,
rms in country j need to wait longer for foreign investment costs in country
i to fall low enough to trigger the FDI option.
We have proved the following:
Proposition 1 : A mean preserving increase (higher volatility) in foreign
investment uncertainty drives a greater wedge between trade costs that need to
be saved and foreign investment costs that need to be incurred at the optimal
trigger point between exporting and FDI.
E¤ect of drift : The e¤ect of drift is two fold - e¤ect on the expected
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present value and e¤ect on the opportunity cost of real option between ex-
porting and FDI.
Again, by total di¤erentiation,
@Q
@
@
@
+
@Q
@
= 0 (42)
where  =     is the di¤erence between the discount factor (riskless
rate) and the drift of the stochastic process as described above.
The partial derivative @Q
@
=   is negative because  is the positive
root of fundamental quadratic dened above. That partial derivative @Q
@
is
positive has already been proved above. Hence, for the total di¤erentiation
equality to hold, the partial derivative @
@
must be positive.
Thus, a lower drift (lower ) implies a higher ; which from the partial
derivative above means a higher . This in turn implies a lower wedge or a
lower scale-up (1+

) between the trade costs saved and the foreign investment
costs incurred. This is the opportunity cost or implicit insurance premium
of holding the FDI option.
Further, a lower  also implies a lower GRi(t0)
  and hence lower expected
present value of foreign investment costs given that both  and  are positive
fractions less than one (they are percentages) and that  >  given the
assumption of a convergent solution.
We have thus established the second proposition:
Proposition 2 : A lower drift of foreign investment uncertainty has two
fold e¤ect on the FDI decision of exporting rms. It has a direct e¤ect through
a decrease in the expected present value of foreign investment costs incurred
and an indirect e¤ect through a decrease in the size of wedge or optimal scale-
up between the trade costs saved and the foreign investment costs incurred.
Put together, they imply an increase in chances of early exercise of the FDI
option.
E¤ect of Risk aversion: Till now the FDI-option was analyzed assuming
rms are risk-neutral, a procedure called risk-neutral valuation. Suppose
now that rms (investors and/or managers) are risk averse. While earlier,
volatility a¤ected the optimal decision of risk-neutral rms directly, it now
has an additional e¤ect through the driftterm.
The simplest way to allow risk-aversion is to replace riskless discount
rate () with an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate () from the capital
asset pricing model (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Risk-aversion essentially
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means allowing for returns to adjust as  changes. Each unit increase in 
now requires an increase in risk-adjusted discount rate by a coe¢ cient term
containing the correlation coe¢ cient and the market price of risk as given by
the equation below (for details see Appendix C):
 =    = + fm    (43)
Here,  is the market price of risk, fm is the correlation coe¢ cient be-
tween the value of FDI option and the whole market portfolio, while ; 
and  are the parameters as dened above. The meaning of the term  now
becomes clearer. It is the opportunity cost of delaying foreign investment
and keeping the option to undertake FDI alive.
While volatility of the foreign investment costs mattered even for risk-
neutral rms (Proposition 1 above), in the presence of risk-aversion it matters
even more. For a put option (unlike a call) the correlation coe¢ cient is
negative, as the positive deviations of uncertainty decrease (and not increase)
the payo¤s from exercising this option. Thus, a higher volatility, ; implies
a lower ; which in accordance with the result above, further increases the
wedge or optimal scale-up 1+

of trade costs over the foreign investment
costs. We have thus established the third proposition:
Proposition 3 : If rms are risk-averse, as compared to when they are
risk-neutral, they will need either lower foreign investment costs or greater
saving of trade costs before they can undertake FDI abroad. In the presence of
falling foreign investment costs, this implies a greater wait and watch before
the FDI option is exercised.
Country Size and Income:
Since income is endogenous in general equilibrium, the variable of interest
here is the total factor endowment Si: Let us say, skilled factor endowment
of country i is growing with time at a dened rate :
Si (t
) = Sioet (44)
Equilibrium conditions for country j rms, in complementary slackness
form, can now be written as follows:

  p
1  1 e 1i0 Sio +


p1 e 1j Sj 


(Hn +G) (Nnj )
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  p
1 e 1i1 Sio+
j

p1 e 1j Sj 


(Hm+G)+(
1 + 

)[GR0+
GRi
   ] (N
m
j )
(45)
This raises the strike price, and hence, payo¤s from exercising the FDI
option:
T =

  p
1 ( 1 e 1i0   e 1i1 )Sio (46)
Such a country then naturally becomes a more attractive destination for
FDI. We have established the following:
Proposition 4 : Country with a larger market size/greater endowment of
skilled factors is more likely to attract foreign direct investment given a level
of the trade costs saved and the foreign investment costs incurred. This is
because it raises the strike price and hence, payo¤s from exercising the FDI
option.
Compare this result with the conventional model, where positive e¤ects
of market size on foreign direct investment come through the scale economies
(Markusen and Venables, 1998). Here, we not only have the usual scale e¤ects
due to increasing returns at the rm level, but also an additional e¤ect due
to increase in strike price and hence payo¤s from exercising the FDI option.
I have focussed on the foreign investment uncertainty here for the simple
reason that it is relevant to the facts-in-issue and is closely related to FDI
policy in the real world. For simplicity, I have assumed there are no demand
or productivity shocks. I will now proceed to extend the model by intro-
ducing Poisson jumps in the stochastic process, which o¤er a better way of
modelling uncertainty related to policy and the impact of FDI reforms, as
foreign investment liberalisation is popularly known in emerging economies
today.
5 Poisson Jump Process
Geometric Brownian motion (with drift) is an important theoretical bench-
mark, but for more comprehensive analysis I will extend this model by for-
mulating a mixed Brownian motion-Poisson jump process. Foreign invest-
ment uncertainty arises from a variety of sources, including but not lim-
ited to private sector expectations of public policy, sudden policy shifts like
economic liberalisation/FDI reforms, changes in corporate tax/governance
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regimes; exchange rate costs related to repatriation of prots, royalty pay-
ments, headquarter services or cross-border investment ows; industry or
economy wide macro-shocks, political instability etc. Among alternative sto-
chastic processes mixed Brownian motion-Poisson jump process is the closest
one can get to such policy related uncertainties.
Let us allow for the possibility of a downward jump  that can suddenly
bring down the foreign investment costs in country i. Let  be the probability
that such a downward jump can arrive in any time-period. If it arrives, the
foreign investment costs would fall irreversibly to 1    times the original
value. The stochastic shift process driving the foreign investment costs will
now be represented by a mixed Brownian motion-Poisson jump process given
below:
dRi = iRidt+ iRidWt  Ridq, (47)
where dq =  with probability 
dq = 0 with probability 1   in any time-period dt
and other terms are as described before.
The expected percentage change in foreign investment costs in country i
is now given by :
E[dGRi] = (i   )GRi:dt (48)
and expected variance of this change is :
V ar[dGRi] = 
2(GRi)
2dt+ 2(GRi)
2dt (49)
As before we need to solve for the optimal foreign investment rule for an
individual rm in two steps. First, nd the expected present value of foreign
investment costs and Second, nd the scale-up factor that implies implicit
insurance premium of holding the FDI option.
First, the expected present value of xed costs for a rm holding this FDI
option is given by (for details see Appendix D):


(Hm +G) + GR0 +
GRi(t0)
  +  (50)
Intuitively it says, a higher probability of FDI reforms (higher ) or a
higher impact of FDI reforms (higher  implying a greater percentage fall
22
in foreign investment costs) decrease the present value of foreign investment
costs making foreign direct investment more likely.
Secondly, we need to solve for the opportunity cost of holding this FDI
option.
The partial di¤erential equation can now be written as:
(  )RF 0 (R)dt+ 1
2
2R2F "(R)dt  [F (R) F (R(1  ))]dt = Rdt (51)
The boundary conditions remain the same:
1:F (1;T ) = 0 (52)
2:F (R;T ) = T  R (53)
3:
@F (R;T )
@R
=  1 (54)
The general solution is again of the form
F (R;1;T ) = a1R + a2R  (55)
As before, the rst boundary condition implies
a1 = 0 (56)
The second or the value matching condition implies
a2 = (T  R)R (57)
 is now the positive solution (negative solution is ruled out by the bound-
ary conditions) to the following characteristic non-linear equation:
1
2
2 () (   1) + (  ) () + (1  )   (+ ) = 0 (58)
This equation does not have an analytic solution and so it needs to be
solved numerically. For  = 0:2;  = 0:05;  = 0:03;  = 0:05 and  = 0:2,
the graph of this equation is drawn in Figure 2 (on page 36 in the appendix).
 = 1:8267 is its positive solution.
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This is the only part of this model that needs to be solved numerically.
The remaining derivation required in obtaining the optimal foreign invest-
ment rule can be done analytically.
Smooth pasting implies
@F (R;1;T )
@R
=  a2R   1 =  1 (59)
Substituting for a2 gives:
  (T  R)RR   1 =  1 (60)
Solving for the optimal scale-up factor again gives:
T =
1 + 

bR (61)
As we can see, the optimal foreign investment rule or the scale-up over
foreign investment costs remains the same. As before, it is a deterministic,
time independent solution. However,  now has di¤erent values obtained as
a numerical solution to the characteristic non-linear equation 58 above.
As before, equilibrium conditions for country js rms can be written in
the complementary slackness form as follows:


p1  1 e 1i0 Si +


p1 e 1j0 Sj 


(Hn +G) (Nnj )


p1 e 1i1 Si+


p1 e 1j1 Sj 


(Hm+G)+(
1 + 

)[GR0+
GRi(t0)
  +  ] (N
m
j )
(62)
I will again perform some comparative experiments. The di¤erence is
that now I will solve numerically for  each time an exogenous parameter
changes.
E¤ect of Volatility: As volatility of foreign investment uncertainty in-
creases, the value of  decreases. This solution for various values of  is
given in Table 2.1 below:
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     
0.05 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 3.3263
0.10 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 2.5772
0.15 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 2.1146
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 1.8267
0.25 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 1.6367
0.30 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 1.5046
0.35 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 1.4091
0.40 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 1.3378
This result is the same as in Proposition 1 above. Higher volatility im-
plies a lower  and therefore a higher wedge or higher scale-up over foreign
investment costs i.e. to undertake FDI the rms need either a higher saving
of transport costs or in the presence of falling foreign costs, they wait longer
before the FDI option can be exercised.
E¤ect of Drift: An increase in , which implies a lower drift, leads to an
increase in the value of  as shown in Table 2.2 below:
     
0.20 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.2 1.3432
0.20 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.2 1.5666
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 1.8267
0.20 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.2 2.1223
This decreases the optimal scale-up 1+

over the foreign investment costs.
Besides, it also implies a lower expected present value of foreign investment
costs (equation 50 above). Both these e¤ects together imply the result in
Proposition 2 above, meaning thereby that falling foreign investment costs
increase the chances of an early exercise of the FDI option.
Probability of FDI reforms: A higher probability of FDI reforms, as mea-
sured by the factor , increases the value of  as shown in Table 2.3 below:
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     
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.2 1.5811
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.2 1.8267
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.10 0.2 2.0887
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.2 2.3602
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.20 0.2 2.6356
This decreases the optimal scale-up 1+

over the foreign investment costs.
Further, it decreases the expected present value of foreign investment costs
(equation 50 above). The combined e¤ect is summarized in Proposition 5
below:
Proposition 5: An increase in the probability of a sudden drop in foreign
investment costs decreases the optimal scale-up over foreign investment costs
and also decreases the expected present value of foreign investment costs.
This dual e¤ect facilitates foreign direct investment by increasing chances of
an early exercise of the FDI option.
Impact of FDI reforms: A larger impact of FDI reforms as measured by
the percentage parameter  also increases the value of parameter  as shown
in Table 2.4 below:
     
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.00 1.5811
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.10 1.7063
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.20 1.8267
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.30 1.9356
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.40 2.0280
0.20 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.50 2.1018
This decreases the optimal scale-up 1+

over foreign investment costs.
Further, it decreases the expected present value of foreign investment costs
(equation 50 above). The combined e¤ect on foreign direct investment is
summarized in Proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6 : An increase in size of the percentage downward jump in
foreign investment costs decreases the optimal scale-up over foreign invest-
ment costs and also decreases the expected present value of foreign invest-
ment costs. This dual e¤ect facilitates foreign direct investment by increasing
chances of an early exercise of the FDI option.
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6 Conclusion
Real life behaviour of multinational rms is somewhat more complex
than what can be explained by conventional comparative advantage-trade
cost analysis. Almost all countries, including the developed ones, have spe-
cic FDI regimes which are driven by policy changes. Even when FDI reforms
bring down foreign investment costs, multinational rms do not immediately
rush in. There is a considerable wait and watch, a kind of time lag or inertia
before investments actually start owing in. This is more commonly seen in
developing economies, where foreign investment uncertainty is expected to
be high. This model shows that, by indulging in such cautious behaviour,
multinational rms are actually seeking additional compensation for some
real costs over and above what can be accounted for in a conventional cost-
benet analysis. Although, for rigorous exposition, this model is solved in
a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, the idea behind this model is more general. For
example, it could be applied to a sub-national context, where State Gov-
ernments compete for inward investment within a framework of competitive
federalism.
In this paper, I rst solve for the optimal foreign investment rule, which
is a deterministic, time-independent solution. Foreign investment costs are
scaled up by a factor, which depends on the parameters of foreign investment
uncertainty. This implies hysteresis, because in the presence of falling for-
eign investment costs, multinational rms will wait longer than they would
have in the absence of such uncertainty. Similarly, given comparative advan-
tage and trade costs between alternative locations, rms prefer the ones with
less uncertain foreign investment environments.
Greater volatility and risk aversion delay the exercise of FDI option, while
growing market size (national income) facilitates its early exercise. A partic-
ularly interesting aspect of this paper is the mixed Poisson jump-Brownian
motion process, which explicitly models policy driven FDI reforms. It shows
how a sudden drop in foreign investment costs brought about by a policy
shift, as also a greater probability of it, can facilitate early exercise of the
FDI option.
To summarize, this paper enriches the existing general equilibriummodels
of multinational rms by providing a better explanation for their observed
behaviour in uncertain foreign environments. It embeds the theory of real
options into a framework of Dixit-Stiglitz type monopolistic competition. It
explicitly solves for the policy driven FDI liberalization as a mixed Poisson
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jump-Brownian motion stochastic process. And further, while the investment
under uncertainty literature is based on the theory of call options, I solve the
FDI optionas a put option, thereby also enriching the theory of real options.
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Appendix A : Solving the Static Model
1) Zero prot condition for national rms in country j:
pXnjj + pX
n
ji  wcXnjj + wcXnji + w(Hn +G) (Nnj )
Bring the quantities produced of each variety to the left hand side:
(p  wc)Xnjj + (p  wc)Xnji  w(Hn +G) (Nnj )
Substitute using the mark-up or pricing equations :
p

Xnjj +
p

Xnji  w(Hn +G) (Nnj )
Substitute using the marshallian demand functions:
p1 e 1j wSj + p
1  1 e 1i wSi  w(Hn +G) (Nnj )
Cancelling out wages from both sides gives the required equation :
p1 e 1j Sj + p
1  1 e 1i Si  (Hn +G) (Nnj )
2) Zero prot condition for multinational rms in country j:
pXmjj + pX
m
ji  wcXmjj + wcXmji + w(Hm +G) + wGmi (Nmj )
Bring the quantities produced of each variety to the left hand side:
(p  wc)Xmjj + (p  wc)Xmji  w(Hm +G) + wGmi (Nmj )
Substitute using the pricing or mark-up equations:
p

Xmjj +
p

Xmji  w(Hm +G) + wGmi (Nmj )
Substitute using the marshallian demand functions:
p1 e 1j wSj + p
1 e 1i wSi  w(Hm +G) + wGmi (Nmj )
Cancelling out wages from both sides gives us the required equation :
p1 e 1j Sj + p
1 e 1i Si  (Hm +G) + Gmi (Nmj )
The same can now be repeated for national and multinational rms in
country i to get the results stated in equation 17.
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Appendix B : Solving the Stochastic Integral
To solve for the expected present value of multinational operation, we
need to solve the following stochastic integral:
E
1Z
t
e tfGRi:e(i  122i )tgfeWtg:dt
A crucial part of this expression is the expectation of the Wiener process
EtfeWtg;
I undertake a change of variable by dening Zt = eWt.
By Itos lemma
dZt = e
WtdWt +
1
2
2eWtdt
Writing it in the integral form :
Zt = Z0 + 
tZ
0
eWsdWs +
tZ
0
1
2
2eWsds
Taking expectation of both the sides and using the fact that E [Z0] = 1
(because by denition W0 = 0); and that E[
tZ
0
eWsdWs] = 0 (increments
of Wiener process are independent of the observed past), this expectation
simplies to :
E [Zt] = 1 +
tZ
0
1
2
2E[eWs ]ds
I now dene another change of variable E [Zt] = xt.
The expression is now equivalent to an ordinary di¤erential equation
dxt
xt
= 1
2
2xsds with initial condition x0 = 1:
And its solution is xt = E [Zt] = e
1
2
2t:
Substituting the changed variables back into the stochastic integral , the
1
2
2t terms cancel out and the stochastic expectation simplies to:
EfGRi:e(i  122i )tgfeWtg = GRi:et
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Appendix C : E¤ect of Risk Aversion
The simplest way to allow for risk-aversion is to replace riskless discount
rate () with an appropriate risk-adjusted discount rate () from the capital
asset pricing model. If the rms undertaking FDI are risk-averse, then from
the CAPM formula, the risk-adjusted rate of return for holding the FDI
option would be:
 = + [E (m)  ]
Cov
 
dF
F
; m

V ar (m)
where m is the rate of return on the whole market portfolio,  is the
risk-neutral rate and F is the option value function. The covariance-variance
term is the correlation coe¢ cient between the value of option and the whole
market portfolio (also called the systematic risk or market beta). I will denote
this by fm. The sign of covariance (correlation coe¢ cient) could be positive
or negative.
Multiplying and dividing the second term on right hand side by the
volatility parameter  gives:
 = +
[E (m)  ]

Cov
 
dF
F
; m

V ar (m)
:
Since, [E(m) ]

is, by denition, the market price of risk (let us call it ),
the above equation becomes:
 = + fm
Since, parameter  has already been dened as the di¤erence between the
drift and the discount rate
 =    = + fm   
This gives us equation 43, which forms the basis for Proposition 3 above.
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Appendix D : Present Value of Fixed Costs for the Poisson
Jump Process
The stochastic shift process with Poisson jumps is given by
dRi = iRidt+ iRidWt  Ridq
This implies dRi could take the following di¤erent values, which along
with their respective probabilities, are :
dRi = i + Ri
p
dt with probability
1
2
(1  ) dt
i   Ri
p
dt with probability
1
2
(1  ) dt
i   Ri with probability dt
The Poisson jump is assumed to be much bigger than a single increment
in the Wiener process.
We know from the properties of Brownian motion that E [dWt] = 0 i.e.
expected change in Wiener process for any time period dt is zero.
Expected change in foreign xed costs over any time period dt is therefore
given by the equation:
E [GRi] = (i   )GRi:dt
The (strong) solution to the stochastic di¤erential equation for mixed
Poisson jump-Brownian motion process is:
GRi = GRt=0
tZ
0
exp[

i    
1
2
2

t+ Wt]dt
To solve for the expected foreign xed costs, we need to solve the expec-
tation of the stochastic exponential on right hand side:
Et [GRi] = Et[GRt=o
tZ
0
expf

i    
1
2
2

tg: expfWtg:dt]
which implies
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Et [GRi] = GRt=o
tZ
0
expf

i    
1
2
2

tg:Et[expfWtg]dt
Solving the stochastic exponential as in the Appendix B above gives:
Et[expfWtg] = exp(1
2
2t)
We can now get rid of the expectation term on the right hand side as
everything else is deterministic. Since
Et [GRi] = GRt=o
tZ
0
expf(i   ) tgdt
starting at a time t between t = 0 and t =1 and potentially operating
forever, expected present value of xed costs, for a country j multinational
rm undertaking foreign direct investment in country i, is given by:
Etf
1Z
t
e t[(Hm +G)]:dt+ GR0 +
1Z
t
e t(GRi:e(i  
1
2
2i )teWt)dtg
=
1Z
t
e t[(Hm +G)]:dt+ GR0 + Etf
1Z
t
e t(GRi:e(i  
1
2
2i )teWt)dtg
=


(Hm +G) + GR0 +
GRi
  + 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Figure 2: Graph for the characteristic equation of the mixed Poisson
jump-Brownian motion stochastic process [parameter  on the x-axis and
function f () on the y-axis].
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